The Government Accountability Office on Tuesday said the Defense Department has not fully coordinated how it manages risks in the industrial base that supplies military satellites, and it recommended three changes.

The department agreed with all three recommendations, according to the report, which was publicly released Nov. 17, 2026. The recommendations remain open.

The department depends on a global network of companies that supply hardware, software and raw materials so it can buy and use satellites that support warfighters, GAO said. Until recently, those missions depended on small numbers of large satellites that adversaries could target. To reduce that risk, the department is building networks of hundreds of smaller satellites, which are harder to disrupt.

As demand from the department and the commercial sector grows, so does the strain on the supply chain, the report said. As a result, the department has faced challenges getting the satellite parts it needs. The space industrial base is a subset of the wider defense industrial base, which GAO monitors as part of its High Risk Series.

That strain poses a risk to the Space Force’s ability to buy the technologies it plans to use for future missions, GAO said. The Space Force is organized under the Department of the Air Force.

GAO reviewed three Space Force programs. Those programs reported supply chain risks, including challenges with manufacturing capability or capacity for some critical satellite components. The public summary did not name the three programs.

Recent department efforts are underway to address risks more broadly across the space industrial base. They include a study of supply chain risks facing large groups of satellites in low-Earth orbit and investments to increase manufacturing capacity.

The Space Force has taken steps to address its space industrial base risks, but it has not fully coordinated those efforts across the national security space portfolio, GAO found.

The Air Force issued a memorandum in April 2026 announcing an enterprise risk management service. The service is intended to give a wide view of space supply chain risks, among other things, so the Space Force could use that information to support higher-level decisions. The memorandum does not identify a lead agency or official to manage the service or clearly define roles and responsibilities, GAO said.

In April 2026, Space Systems Command created a guide for a process to identify and address space supply chain risks across that portfolio. The guide cannot be enforced for stakeholders outside the Space Force, such as the National Reconnaissance Office. Formal agreements could strengthen participation and accountability, and help ensure that risks are identified and managed as the portfolio grows and continues to strain the supply chain, GAO said.

A Senate report includes a provision for GAO to assess the military space industrial base and its supply chains. GAO reviewed program risk documents and interviewed department officials. It also compared recent Space Force efforts with its standards for enterprise risk management and for collaboration across agencies.

The first recommendation asks the secretary of defense to make sure the Air Force secretary and the National Reconnaissance Office director together set up a coordinated approach. That approach would include formal agreements and would provide authority, support and decision-making to manage industrial base and supply chain risks across the national security space portfolio.

The other two recommendations go to the Department of the Air Force. They ask the secretary of the Air Force to ensure that the Service Acquisition Executive for Space Systems and Programs creates a leadership structure with defined roles for the enterprise-level risk service, and issues formal guidance for that service covering the Space Force’s national security space programs.

GAO said it will update information on the recommendations after it confirms what actions the agencies take.